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L. Introduction
In his Note, Beyond BA TSA: Getting Serious About State Corporate Tax
Reform,' Quinn Ryan provides us with the following: (1) an overview of the
problem of diminishing state corporate tax revenues;2 (2) the basic legal
principles applicable in administering state corporate income taxes;3 and (3) a
history of the development of state tax nexus standards.4 Ryan uses the
Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 20095 (BATSA) to point out where
reform is necessary and argues that BATSA is not the answer.6 While Ryan
notes the myriad of problems with corporate income tax apportionment
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. Quinn T. Ryan, BeyondBATSA: Getting Serious About State Corporate Tax Reform,
67 WAsH. & LEE L. Rnv. 275 (2010).
2. Id at 278-80.
3. Idat 280-30 1.
4. Id at 301-07.
5. Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2009 (BATSA), H.R. 1083, 111lth Cong.
6. Ryan, supra note 1, at 320-25.
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statutes 7 he leaves the mechanics of a uniform system for another Note .8 My
only comment on apportionment, then, is that as an old Jeffersonian, I would
prefer to see a state-by-state adoption of a uniform apportionment statute rather
than having Congress federalize state tax codes with a mandated federal
standard.
The core of Ryan's Note is an argument for the economic presence
standard for state tax nexus in lieu of the physical presence standard. 9 While I
find Ryan's analysis and arguments quite interesting, I am unpersuaded.
Again, my Jeffersonian side balks at the idea of breaking down state geographic
boundaries. More to the point, I do not believe the physical presence standard
to be as problematic as Ryan contends, nor do I see the economic presence
standard as being any less problematic (perhaps, even, the economic presence
standard is more problematic for small businesses and the internet-based
economy).
Let me follow Ryan's lead: This Comment, first, looks at the history of
the physical presence standard for state tax nexus and, second, compares and
contrasts the physical presence standard with the economic presence standard.
II. Historical Context
As any law student who did not sleep through Constitutional Law would
know, the Constitution was drafted to address, among other things, the problem
of the federal government having no power to stop states from creating trade
barriers between each other. States' power over commerce, "guided by
inexperience and jealousy, began to show itself in iniquitous laws and impolitic
measures ... , destructive to the harmony of the States, and fatal to their
commercial interests abroad. This was the immediate cause, that led to the
forming of a convention."' 0 The new Constitution granted to Congress the
power "to regulate Commerce ... among the several States"-the Commerce
Clause." Congress and the courts, therefore, have the authority to strike down
laws that adversely affect interstate commerce, including state tax laws.' 2
7. Id at 280-85.
8. Id. at 311 nn. 194-95, 313 nn.209-1 1 and accompanying text.
9. Id. at 307-10.
10. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 224 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
11. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
12. The federal courts may act when Congress is silent under the Dormant, or Negative,
Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252
(1829) ("We do not think that the act .. , can .. ,. be considered as repugnant to the power to
regulate commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the
342
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The Supreme Court initially declared that states could not tax or impede
interstate commerce at all: "A State is ... precluded from taking any action
which may fairly be deemed to have the effect of impeding the free flow of
trade between States." 13 The Court began its move away from that standard in
the 1950Os, when it treated almost identical taxes differently based on "magic
words" in the statute. By example, an annual license tax imposed on the in-
state gross receipts of an out-of-state company was invalidated as
discriminating against interstate commerce, while an identical tax imposed as a
franchise tax on in-state going concern value, measured by in-state gross
receipts, was upheld.'1
4
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,'15 the Court abandoned its for-Mal
standard and announced four factors the courts should examine when
determining whether a tax on interstate commerce is valid: (1) whether a
sufficient connection between the taxpayer and the state exists; (2) whether the
state taxes beyond its fair share of the taxpayer's income; (3) whether the state
imposes burdens on out-of-state taxpayers but not in-state taxpayers; and
(4) whether the tax is fairly related to services provided to the taxpayer by the
state.'16 This is the four-pronged Complete Auto test.
The nexus requirement-the first prong of Complete Auto-was amplified
by the Court in National Geographic Society v. California Board of
Equalization,'17 when it reaffirmed a rule from the earlier case of National
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue:'1
8
subject.").
13. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249,252 (1946); see also Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127
U.S. 640, 648 (1888) ("[jN]o State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any
fom... and the reason is that such taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to a
regulation of it, which belongs solely to Congress.").
14. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 284 (1977) (comparing
Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954), and Railway Express Agency v.
Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959)).
15. See id. at 289 (affirming Supreme Court of Mississippi's holding that Mississippi
sales tax on privilege of doing business in the state to motor carriers' activity was not
unconstitutional based on a four factor standard).
16. See id at 279 ("[Precedent dictates that a court should] sustain[] a tax against
Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with
the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is
fairly related to the services provided by the State.").
17. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 562 (1977)
(concluding that "the Society's continuous presence in California in offices that solicit
advertising for its magazine provides a sufficient nexus to justify that State's imposition upon
the Society of the duty to act as collector of the use tax").
18. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758-60 (1967) (holding
that Illinois had no power to impose liability on out-of-state mail order firm to collect use taxes
343
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In order to uphold the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens on
National in this case, we would have to repudiate totally the sharp
distnction . .. between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or
property within a State, and those who do no more than communicate with
customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general
interstate business.' 9
Thus, if a company has no offices, no employees, or no other property in a
state, it lacks nexus to the taxing state under Complete Auto and cannot be
subject to taxation.
The Bellas Hess Court noted practical concerns:
If Illinois can impose such burdens, so can every other State, and so,
indeed, can every municipality, every school district, and every other
political subdivision throughout the Nation with power to impose sales and
use taxes. The many variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions,
and in administrative and record-keeping requirements could entangle
National's interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations
to local jurisdictions with no le~itimate claim to impose "a fair share of the
cost of the local government."
In other words, the Court was concerned about the danger that mail-order
companies would be subject to multiple taxations and a heavy administrative
burden, and that practical concern enforced the Court's determination that
states had no legitimate power to impose tax obligations on companies that
were not physically present in the state.
M. W"ere We Are--Quill
Finding the physical presence rule of Bellas Hess formalistic and
outmoded, some state courts simply disregarded the decision:
The economic, social, and commercial landscape upon which Bellas Hess
was premised no longer exists, save perhaps in the fertile imaginations of
attorneys representing mail order interests.... The burgeoning
technological advances of the 1970's and 1980's have created
revolutionary communications abilities and marketing methods which were
undreamed of in 1967.1
imposed by state law).
19. Id at 758.
20. Id. at 759-60.
21. State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 208 (N.D. 1991), rev'd, Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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In 1992, in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 22 the Supreme Court considered
the "new economy" criticisms of Bellas Hess, but then reaffirmed the physical
presence rule.2 The case involved a Delaware office supplies company with
some $1 million in sales to 3,000 customers in North Dakota, but no employees
or property in the state.2 Ultimately, the Court rejected the move toward an
economic presence standard, with the Court giving several reasons for its
21decision.
The Court emphasized the nexus requirement of Complete Auto. 26 By
requiring a connection between a taxing state and a company, nexus "ensure[s]
that state taxation does not unduly burden interstate commerce.",27 In North
Dakota, any company that advertised three times in the state became obligated
to collect taxes for the state,2 and the Court found that obligation a burden on
29interstate commerce.
The Court discussed "the continuing value of a bright-line rule."3 0 The
physical presence rule "firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state
authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces litigation
concerning those taxes."3 1 The Court fuirther stated: "The continuing value of
a bright-line rule in this area and the doctrine and principles of stare decisis
indicate that the Bellas Hess rule remains good law."
3 2
Justice Scalia noted that the only litigation in twenty-five years of applying
Bellas Hess involved state efforts to overrule it: "[C]oncern that reaffirmance
of Bellas Hess will lead to a flurry of litigation over the meaning of 'physical
presence,' seems to me contradicted by 25 years of experience under the
decision."3 3 The majority had stated the following: "A bright-line rule in the
area of sales and use taxes also encourages settled expectations and, in doing
22. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 320 (1992) (reversing the North
Dakota Supreme Court and finding North Dakota's enforcement of its use of tax against Quill
placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce).
23. Id at 310-12.
24. Id at 302.
25. Id at 305-20.
26. Idat 313.
27. Id





33. Id at 321 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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so, fosters investment by businesses and individuals. "34  Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas were not persuaded to upset those expectations:
"Having affirmatively suggested that the 'physical presence' rule could be
reconciled with our new jurisprudence, we ought not visit economic hardship
upon those who took us at our word."3 5
The Court clarified that the physical presence rule is a Commerce Clause
concept and that Due Process Clause arguments are governed by the minimum
contacts rule of personal jurisdiction: "The requirements of due process are
met irrespective of a corporation's lack of physical presence in the taxing
State."3 6 While Quill Corp. had sufficient minimum contacts under the Due
Process Clause, its lack of physical presence meant there was insufficient nexus
to be within the taxing power of the state under the Commerce Clause.
Because the physical presence test is based on the Commerce Clause, the
Court noted that Congress could change the test if it wished: "No matter how
we evaluate the burdens that use taxes impose on interstate commerce,
Congress remains free to disagree with our conclusions. 3 7 More to the point,
Justice Scalia declared: "Congress has the final say over regulation of interstate
commerce, and it can change the rule of Bellas Hess by simply saying so."8
IV Brave New Mess
Ryan joins a long list of critics of the physical presence rule, reaffirmed in
Quill. "[S]ales tax equity can be fully achieved only if Quill's anachronistic
physical presence test is either judicially or legislatively overruled.",39 Those
criticisms have their genesis in the dissents in Bellas Hess and Quill, and
champion the concept of "economic nexus." "Economic nexus" refers to the
assertion ofjurisdiction based on something other than physical presence in the
taxing state. The term first appeared in the Bellas Hess dissent, where Justice
Fortas argued that nexus exists if an "out-of-state company is engaged in
exploiting the local market on a regular, systematic, large-scale basis.",40 The
34. Id. at 316 (majority opinion).
35. Id. at 321 (Scalia, J., concurring).
36. Id at 308 (majority opinion).
37. Idat 318.
38. Id at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring).
39. John A. Swain, Cybertaxation and the Commerce Clause: Entity Isolation or Affiliate
Nexus?, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 419, 473 (2002).
40. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 763 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
dissenting).
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concept relies upon factors such as "the frequency, quantity and systematic
nature of a taxpayer's economic contacts with a state" to determine if there is
sufficient nexus to subject the activity to that state's taxation .4'1 The arguments
for the economic presence have been summed up with the following
,,42
declaration: "Taxable activity should imply nexus ....
Some lower courts have adopted economic nexus. In Geojfrey, Inc. v.
South Carolina Tax Commission, 43 South Carolina imposed a corporate income
tax on Geoffrey, Inc. (Geoffrey), a Delaware company with no employees,
offices, or property in the state."4 Geoffrey held the trademarks of its parent,
Toys "R" Us, Inc., and leased those trademarks back to its parent for a royalty.4
The result was that much of the profit earned in South Carolina Toys "R" Us
stores was paid to the subsidiary, which paid lower taxes in Delaware.4 The
South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the taxation of Geoffrey, ruling that it
had accounts receivable in South Carolina-and therefore nexus existed.4
Geoffrey had "contemplated and purposefully sought the benefit of economic
contact with" South Carolina.4 The primary reason for finding nexus,
however, was that Geoffr~ey had licensed intangibles in the state: "It is well
settled that the taxpayer need not have a tangible, physical presence in a state
for income to be taxable there. The presence of intangible property alone is
sufficient to establish nexus.",49 Other states have joined South Carolina in
using the in-state "presence" of intangibles to justify the taxation of out-of-state
50companies.
41. Christina R. Edson, Quill 's Constitutional Jurisprudence and Tax Nexus Standards in
an Age of Electronic Commerce, 49 TAx LAW. 893, 945 (1996).
42. Charles E. McLure, Jr., Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Economic Objectives,
Technological Constraints, and Tax Laws, 52 TAx L. R~v. 269, 395 (1997).
43. Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 19 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 992 (1993) (sustaining a state tax on plaintiff's royalty income and finding the state tax not
violative of the Due Process Clause or the Commerce Clause).
44. Id. at 15.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id at 16 ("[Wle find that the 'minimum connection' required by due process also
is satisfied by the presence of Geoffrey's intangible property in this State."); id. at 18 ("We hold
that by licensing intangibles for use in this State and deriving income from their use here,
Geoffrey has a 'substantial nexus' with South Carolina.").
48. Id. at 16.
49. Idatl18.
50. See, e.g., A & F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 195 (N.C. Ct. App.
2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 353 (2005) ("[W]e hold that under facts such as these where a
wholly-owned subsidiary licenses trademarks to a related retail company operating stores
located within North Carolina, there exists a substantial nexus with the State sufficient to satisfy'
347
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And now we have the standard applied by West Virginia in Tax
Commissioner v. AMNA America Bank, N.A.,51 that a nonpresent company is
subject to taxation simply if it has customers present in the state. The state
court had ruled, "MBNA's systematic and continuous business activity in this
State produced significant gross receipts attributable to its West Virginia
customers which indicate a significant economic presence sufficient to meet the
substantial nexus prong of Complete A uto.",52 The court declared that Quill's
physical presence rule applies only to sales and use taxes and not to taxation
and interstate commerce generally. 53 Other courts that have considered West
Virginia's rule have rejected it,54 aligning themselves with the dissent in
AMNA.55
In June 2007, the Supreme Court declined to review the case, which
involved FIA Card Services (formerly MBNA America Bank and now owned
by Bank of America) .56 Although the quarter-million dollars in issue in that
case may not be considered much for a company with yearly profits over $1
billion, MBNA paid taxes on all that income to the state where it was
headquartered: Delaware. If the West Virginia standard were to be followed,
and if every state were to impose similar taxes on every company, the negative
impact on the economy would be obvious.
the Commerce Clause."); Dep't of Revenue v. Gap (Apparel), Inc., 886 So.2d 459,462 (La. Ct.
App. 2004) ("[flf the intangible property [in this case, trademarks] is used in another state in
such a way as to become an integral part of a business carried on within the state, the intangible
property acquires a 'business situs' in that state and is subject to taxation in that state.').
51. Tax Comm'r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226, 235-36 (W. Va. 2006),
cer. denied, 551 U.S. 1141 (2007) (finding that a foreign credit card company, with its
principal place of business and commercial domicile in Delaware, had a substantial economic
presence in West Virginia, thereby establishing a "substantial nexus").
52. Id at 236.
53. Id. at 232.
54. See J.C. Penney Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831, 839-42 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1999) (finding insufficient nexus where an out-of-state bank had over 11,000 credit card
accounts and a parent company physically in state); Cerro Copper Prods., Inc. v. State of Ala.
Dep't of Revenue, Docket No. F. 94-444, 1995 WL 800114, at *3 (Ala. Dep't Rev. Dec. 11,
1995). ("As a practical matter, the same benefits of a bright-line, physical presence test cited in
Quill for sales and use tax purposes would also apply equally to other types of taxes." (citations
omitted)).
55. See AMNA, 640 S.E.2d at 236 (Benjamin, J., dissenting) ("In its opinion finding tax
liability for an out-of-state corporation with no presence, tangible or intangible, in West
Virginia on income realized out-of-state by that corporation for accounts kept out-of-state, the
majority, in its opinion, boldly goes where no court has gone before.").
56. 551 U.S. 1141 (2007).
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Perhaps the Court's decision not to review MNA should be interpreted as
the Court asking that Congress give the next word on the physical presence rule
after Quill.
V Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease?
What will be the result if the physical presence rule of Quill is jettisoned?
The answer may well be a resulting area of law in which no one is sure what
the rules are. Doctrine is developed case by case, and the facts of a particular
case often preclude completeness or coherence; bad facts make bad law. "[Tihe
Court's ability to fine-tune an economic nexus rule is limited .. . . t 5
Applying geography-based income taxes with a standard unrestricted by
geography will mean multiple taxation and burdensome compliance costs. If a
Virginia company sells a product on its website to a California purchaser via
servers in Michigan and Utah, is the income attributable everywhere, nowhere,
or somewhere in between? Economic nexus would seem to result in taxing the
income from. transactions everywhere; and even if that scenario seems absurd,
taxing the income somewhere can be burdensome to figure out.
The AMNA court, again reaching for the zenith, or nadir, in tax reasoning,
suggested the Commerce Clause itself is outdated: "The Framers' concept of
commerce consisted of goods transported in horse-drawn, wooden-wheeled
wagons or ships with sails. They lived in a world with no electricity, no indoor
plumbing,.... and no iPods."58 Of course constitutional principles must be
sufficiently flexible to apply to new circumstances, but hopefully the concept
that state interests cannot burden interstate commerce remains a constant,
despite the sophisticated new economy and technology.
The economic presence standard discriminates against e-comnmerce and
necessarily favors bricks-and-mortar businesses:
If Congress enacts legislation that essentially overturns Quill Corp., such
legislation will create an undue burden by requiring many e-retailers to
collect use taxes from hundreds of thousands of consumers nationwide and
comply with thousands of different tax codes. Main Street retailers,
however, need only comply with the tax code of the jurisdiction in which
they conduct business. To reduce these costs, e-retailers would likely shift
the burden to consumers by increasing prices. Moreover, imposing those
57. John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Standard
for the Twenty-First Century, 38 GA. L. REv. 343,369 (2003).
58. Tax Comm'r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226, 236 (W. Va. 2006).
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administrative and financial burdens may force smaller online companies
out of business or discourage businesses from engaging in e-commerce.5
Under either the physical presence standard or the economic presence
standard, a bricks-and-mortar store is concerned only about the tax system
where it is physically located. Economic nexus, on the other hand, imposes
additional obligations for each jurisdiction into which an item is sold; it is
"leffectively .. , an export duty on outbound commerce.",60 That export duty
quickly becomes an excessive burden when you consider the different state
rules that determine what is or is not taxed. For Ryan, and others, economic
nexus is a way to end inequity between electronic and bricks-and-mortar
retailers .6'1 But the practical effort will be that economic nexus rule will burden
electronic commerce more than bricks-and-mortar businesses.
" [Ulnder any nexus analysis, multiple taxing jurisdictions may have power
over a remote seller. To avoid multiple taxation only one state may actually
exercise that power.",62  The physical presence rule makes that easy; the
economic nexus rule creates complexity. In A4BNA, West Virginia sought to
tax income already subject to Delaware income tax. Though the second prong
of Complete Auto is intended to prevent a state from taxing beyond its fair
share, multiple states nevertheless will assert that they are entitled to tax the
income. States are unlikely to reach agreements on who gets what share.
"Because of the tension in interests between money market states (states that
are importers of financial services) and money center states (states that are net
exporters of such services), any future agreement on a single method of
allocating and apportioning income among financial institutions seems
unlikely.",63 Economic nexus almost certainly means multiple taxation and
unending litigation involving multiple states.
Physical presence in state taxation imposes some limits on how far state
taxation power can extend. If an economic nexus rule is adopted, geographical
limits become irrelevant, resulting in states unfairly subjecting nonresidents to
excessive taxation.
59. Ryan J. Swartz, The Imposition of Sales and Use Taxes on F-Commerce: A Taxing
Dilemma for States and Remote Sellers, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 143, 156 (2003), available at
http://www.jhtl.org/docs/pdf/RSWARTZV2NIN.pdf.
60. Brian S. Masterson, Note, Collecting Sales and Use Tax on Electronic Commerce: F-
confusion or F-collection, 79 N.C. L. REv. 203, 217 (2000).
61. See, e.g., Swain, supra note 57, at 345 ("If consumer purchases are to be taxed, then
they all should be taxed to avoid discrimination and keep a level playing field.").
62. Masterson, supra note 60, at 215.
63. R. Todd Ervin, Comment, State Taxation of Financial Institutions: Will Physical
Presence or Economic Presence Win the Day?, 19 VA. TAx REv. 515, 531 (2000).
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Adopting an economic nexus standard would unsettle expectations and
potentially threaten economic investments. "Taxpayers, mail-order and Internet
alike, rely on [physical presence] for 'settled expectations' in tax planning and
compliance, as do the states; any change in the standard would result in many
taxpayers finding themselves taxable in far more states than they planned for."64
The effect on e-commerce if an economic nexus standard were adopted, as
noted above, could be extreme:
Just as the mail-order catalog business had grown prior to Quill, so the
financial services industry has expanded .. .. Without the availability of
such credit, a great amount of which often crosses state lines, the growth of
electronic commerce will be substantially hindered. An economic presence
test would threaten income taxation in each state where credit was offered
and, therefore, might tend to discourage creditors--especiall Z smaller, less
wealthy creditors-from extending credit in multiple states.
In other words, any judicial acceptance of economic nexus would adversely
affect e-commerce. A physical presence rule is the only nexus rule that avoids
burdening interstate commerce.
VI. Conclusion
An economic nexus rule is inherently discriminatory against out-of-state
business activity within the context of our state tax systems. As long as state
tax systems are defined by geographical lines, the principles outlined in Ryan's
Note would seem to require that taxes be imposed only on individuals and
businesses within those geographical lines. If one advocates tax liability based
on economic activity without regard to geography, the tax system should not be
defined by geography.
Ryan's Note is a valuable addition to the discussion of state corporate tax
reform. The Note provides an excellent overview of the development of the
physical presence standard for state tax nexus as well as the development of the
economic presence standard. The Note sets out a clear set of evaluative criteria
to guide us through the reform process, and the Note focuses on the two key
issues in state corporate income tax reform-the lack of uniformity in
apportionment statutes and an appropriate standard for determining nexus. I
agree that a more well-developed nexus standard would be useful and
64. Sidney S. Silhan, Note, If It Ain't Broke Don't Fix It: An Argument for the
Codifi cation of the Quill Standardfor Taxing Internet Commerce, 76 CM.-KENT L. RFV. 67 1,
688 (2000).
65. Ervin, supra note 63, at 540-4 1.
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welcomed by both state revenue departments and multi-state corporate
taxpayers. For now, that standard should remain the physical presence
standard. I applaud Ryan's outstanding effort, and look forward to his sequel
on the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act.66
66. UNIF. Div. OF INCOME FOR TAx PURPOSES ACT (1957).
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